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TAKING ISSUE WITH ISSUE ADVOCACY
Ian Ayres*
Professor Lillian BeVier has written a provocative article that reemphasizes
and extends many of her well-known, laissez-faire ideas about campaign fi-
nance.' I am most persuaded by her argument that recent efforts to distinguish
election-related and political spending would not by themselves be sufficient
to avoid the far-reaching analysis of Buckley v. Valeo.2 Professor BeVier's
larger and more important thesis, however, is that the arguments of "regula-
tionists" for restricting issue advocacy are both theoretically and empirically
deficient.3 In this Comment, I wish to do three things:
(1) criticize Professor BeVier's "negative liberty" theory;
(2) criticize some of her more specific arguments about inequality and
accountability; and
(3) suggest that mandating partial anonymity might be a better solution
to the "problem" of issue advocacy.
I will try to be brief.
I. WE ARE ALL REGULATIONISTS
Professor BeVier emphasizes that she analyzes issue advocacy from a dif-
ferent starting point than most other scholars. She says her "task [is] to de-
velop... the implications of a regime of freedom of political speech, taking
freedom to be a negative concept denoting the absence of formal state-
promulgated legal control."4 By describing her "answer" as "negative liberty,"5
Professor BeVier precludes any possibility that the regulationists might offer
"a convincing defense, 6 for limiting issue advocacy.
The maximization of negative liberty, however, is not an attractive normative
benchmark. At least since the time of Robert Hale and Wesley Hohfeld, it
has been understood that the amount of negative freedom is necessarily con-
William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. <ian.ayres@yale.edu>.
See Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and Con-
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2 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3 BeVier, supra note 1, at 1764-65.
4 Id. at 1763.
-1 Id. at 1764.
6 Id. at 1766.
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stant.7 Laws merely distribute a fixed amount of negative freedom.8 Either
Jones has the freedom to make unlimited contributions or Smith has the right
to be free from the effects of such giving. Do prohibitions against quid pro
quo corruption and requirements of contributor disclosure serve as restric-
tions on negative liberty or redistributions of freedom? We can only come to
a conclusion that a particular legal change is an increase in negative freedom
if we ignore the effects on other people in society.
Professor BeVier seems to understand that "realists" want to further some
notion of positive liberty when she says:
I do recognize that persons who are free from formal sovereign con-
trols are not in fact "free" from such importantly constraining limita-
tions as are imposed by their possession of or exposure to relatively
impecunious financial resources, personal intellectual deficiencies,
unhappy genetic inheritances, limited educational opportunities,
homely countenances, limited stature, excessive girth, humorless
souls, or environmental poisons.9
But she still does not "get" the central Halean criticism of negative liberty."0
The state's creation of property rights is "coercive" with regard to people
who do not own the property." Those who are "relatively impecunious" are
not "free from formal sovereign controls" because the sovereign will use its
force to exclude these people from using other people's property. From a
Halean perspective, then, it is impossible to further an agenda of maximizing
negative liberty. In terms of distributing this fixed quantity of negative lib-
erty, we are all regulationists. It is a moniker that should engender neither
embarrassment nor pride.
Professor BeVier's pessimistic theory of the legislative process is also in-
sufficient to support her laissez-faire thesis. Professor BeVier concludes:
[F]ar from embodying an effective public-regarding interpretation of
the collective will, a legislatively enacted regulation on political spend-
ing and speaking would represent the outcome of self-interested po-
litical dealing and would result in a deliberate sovereign incursion on
7 See Ian Ayres, Discrediting the Free Market, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 273, 276 (1999) (re-
viewing Barbara H. Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: Robert Hale and the
First Law and Economics Movement (1998)).
8 See id.
9 BeVier, supra note 1, at 1763.
10 One might also criticize her long concatenation of disparate disabilities as a deliberate
trivialization of the realist project-a litany that is intended to provoke chuckles from the
smugly insensitive conservative readership.
" See Ayres, supra note 7, at 276-78.
12 See id.
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the formal political freedom of those whose speaking and spending it
limited....
But if the outcome of deliberative process is presumptively self-interested, then
why should we expect a laissez-faire outcome to be presumptively public-
regarding? Government inaction (read: incumbents' unwillingness to restrict
issue advocacy) may of course also be a by-product of this "self-interested po-
litical dealing."
In short, neither a commitment to negative liberty nor a pessimistic theory
of legislative outcomes is sufficient grounds for arguing that issue advocacy
should be unregulated. If legislative outcomes are generally self-interested,
then it will generally be difficult (and perhaps impossible) to induce legislators
to enact public-regarding laws. But, more fundamentally, I find the maxi-
mand of negative liberty to provide an inconclusive guide to public policy.
II. NOT SO MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Professor BeVier, however, does go further to take on the "regulationists"
on their own ground. She characterizes the proposals for restricting issue ad-
vocacy as being based on "rhetorical claims [that] beg a number of not-so-
rhetorical questions that would elicit a more detailed and concrete picture
both of what the regulationists think is wrong with our politics now and of
how the regulations they endorse would fix the problem."14 She quotes at
length her previous articles that recite a number of questions and then in effect
says, "I'm still waiting."'5
It seems to me that Professor BeVier is correct that there are many sub-
stantive unanswered questions concerning, for example, what is "enough" in-
formation. But there are more empirical answers to issues of process than
Professor BeVier acknowledges. For example, Professor BeVier claims,
"The premise appears to be that 'inequalities of wealth inevitably generate
inequalities of political power.""..6 Not so. Instead, there is strong evidence
not only of inequalities in wealth but also of inequalities in actual giving.
"'[I]n the 1996 election cycle less than one-fourth of I percent of the Ameri-
can people gave contributions of $200 or more to a federal candidate,' but
this tiny group of donors generated an astonishing eighty percent of total do-
" BeVier, supra note 1, at 1765-66.
14 Id. at 1776.
IsSee id. at 1777 (quoting Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Ar-
guments, Intractable Dilemmas, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1258, 1266 (1994); Lillian R. BeVier,
Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Re-
form, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1045, 1073-74, 1078 (1985)).
"1 Id. at 1778 (quoting Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Argu-
ments, Intractable Dilemmas, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1258, 1263 (1994)).
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nations. The inequalities in observed voluntary giving patterns are strong
evidence that a small proportion of the population has a disproportionate in-
fluence on campaigns. The inference that disproportionate influence is
caused by such disproportionate giving is supported by the plausible assumption
that the wealthy people who contribute money to candidates believe that
their contributions will have an effect.
Professor BeVier's own reliance on statistics showing a shifting pattern of
wealth is extremely misleading. She points to evidence that taxpayers in the
bottom quintile of income in 1979 were "about as likely to be in the highest
[quintile] nine years later as to have stayed in the lowest [quintile]."' 8 Her
statistics are flawed for three reasons. First, the statistics focused on income,
whereas wealth is likely to be a much more stable and more important de-
terminant of political inequality. 9 Second, the statistics do not control for
age, which, because of life-cycle effects, may give an illusion of more instability
than there is in reality? Third, and most importantly, being in the top quin-
tile of income still does not mean that you will have any effect on elections.
If Professor BeVier is implicitly defining the top quintile to be "rich," then
there is strong evidence that the "super rich" are the rarefied class of con-
tributors who disproportionately influence our polity.2' Make no mistake,
patterns of wealth holding are much more stable than Professor BeVier's ar-
17 Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to
Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 837, 851 (1998) (quoting David
Donnelly et al., Going Public, Boston Rev., ApriMay 1997, at 3, 3) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
18 BeVier, supra note 1, at 1779 (citing David R. Henderson, The Rich-and Poor-Are
Getting Richer, Red Herring, Aug. 1997, at 120,120, reprinted in Hoover Dig., 1998 No. 1,
at 17, 18-19).
19 See R. Richard Banks, "Nondiscriminatory" Perpetuation of Racial Subordination, 76
B.U. L. Rev. 669, 675 (1996) (reviewing Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Black
Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality (1995)) ("Although
'[i]ncome is the standard way to study and evaluate family well-being and progress in social
justice and equality,' an analysis of wealth more accurately captures one's social and eco-
nomic position than indicators tied solely to income, education, or occupation.") (alteration
in original and footnotes omitted).
20 See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74
Tex. L. Rev. 1847, 1880 n.128 (1996) ("There is also evidence that mobility studies that use
'short-term proxies for lifetime economic status' overstate economic mobility.") (citation
omitted).
21See Robert Peck et al., Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, 8
Admin. L.J. Am. U. 161, 180 (1994) ("A recent study by the Citizen Participation Project
found that it is the richest citizens making more than $125,000 a year who are most likely to
give.") (footnote omitted); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the
Wealth Primary, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 273,294 (1993) ("In a recent telephone survey of
15,000 Americans, the Citizen Participation Project found that citizens making more than
$125,000 a year, who constitute only 2.7% of the population, are better than ten times
more likely to give a campaign contribution than people making under $15,000 a year, who
constitute 17.7% of the population. Thus, the wealth primary is disproportionately domi-
nated by a small and wealthy fraction of the public.") (footnote omitted).
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tide suggests, and political campaigns in the United States are disproportion-
ately funded by the wealthy.'
To be sure, the super rich are a surprisingly large class. More than two
million Americans have a net worth of over two and a half million dollars.
And it is reasonable to argue that, rather than constraining the contributions
of the rich, it is desirable to let this sizable group fight it out for the hearts
and minds of our government officials. As Jeremy Bulow and I have written:
It might be better to countenance the undue influence of large donors
under the current system than to transfer this influence to an even
smaller media oligarchy. Under this theory, the contributions of James
Riady and the millions of other millionaires among us may provide a
Jeffersonian counterweight against the potentially disproportionate in-
fluence of Citizens Hearst or Murdoch-or the even less accountable
corporations and unions that bankroll issue ads.2 '
But the "millionaires among us" are not as diverse or dynamic as Professor
BeVier would have us believe. At the conference, Professor BeVier in a
candid moment claimed that there are "as many wealthy Democrats as
wealthy Republicans." This claim is also demonstrably false,' but may im-
plicitly undergird Professor BeVier's laissez-faire conclusion.
Professor BeVier also criticizes the regulationists for implicitly arguing
that "there is something... illegitimate... about the political involvement of
'the wealthy."' ' But this criticism is widely off-target. The concern of regu-
lationists is the disproportionate political involvement (read: influence) of the
" See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Supe-
riority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1160, 1178 (1994) ("Obvi-
ously, the real financial energy for political campaigns comes from PACs and wealthy
individuals-the 'richest' citizens making more than $75,000 per year who are '100 times
more likely' than the poor 'to contribute to a political candidate,' according to the Citizen
Participation Project survey directed by Dr. Sidney Verba of Harvard University.") (foot-
note omitted).
13See Richard Todd, Who Me, Rich?, Worth, Sept. 1997, at 70,73.
24Ayres & Bulow, supra note 17, at 876.
21 In 1996, for example, 31% of respondents in a nationally representative sample consid-
ered themselves Republicans and 37% considered themselves Democrats. Of respondents
with household incomes of $50,000 and over, the figures were 41% Republican versus 29%
Democrat. See Harold W. Stanley & Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American
Politics 1997-1998, at 111 tbl.3-2 (1998) (based on unpublished data from the Gallup Poll,
Nov. 3-4, 1996). Of course, as emphasized above, much may depend on the choice of cut-
off for defining who is wealthy. If we set the minimum prerequisite for being wealthy as
having at least $80 billion, then the question of whether the wealthy are disproportionately
Republican will turn solely on the political leanings of Bill Gates (who, with the recent
Clinton administration antitrust suits, has been increasing his giving to Republicans, see
Gates: Testifies Before Cmte; Makin' Some GOP Friends, The Hotline, June 16,1999, avail-
able in Westlaw, 6/16/99 APN-HO 18). Wealth cutoffs may exist, however, for which there
are equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans.
2 BeVier, supra note 1, at 1780.
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wealthy. The fact (which Professor BeVier emphasizes) that 10% of income
brackets pay 59.1% of all federal income taxes7 does not mean that this
group is entitled to 59% of the country's voting power or political influence.
Finally, Professor BeVier challenges an empirical assertion, which Jeremy
Bulow and I made, that, "because candidates are not accountable for 'inde-
pendent' ad campaigns, these campaigns are likely to be particularly negative
and reckless. ' 28 She responds that "the factual assertion that lack of account-
ability is correlated with reckless, negative, and deceitful speech is unde-
fended."29  But Professor BeVier ignores the very sentence following our
quoted assertion, which reads: "It is not surprising, therefore, that the infamous
'Willie Horton' ads were independent expenditures. '  While Professor
BeVier is right that a single example does not generally prove that issue ads
tend to be more negative than candidate ads, I believe it is at least the case
that the most negative ads are funded by independent expenditures.
Appreciating the different mechanisms of accountability predicts just such
a result. For an example of this phenomenon, consider the negative inde-
pendent expenditure ads run by the Auto Dealers and Drivers for Free
Trade PAC ("Autopac") in the 1990 United States Senate race in New
Hampshire. This negative ad campaign, designed by the same attack-ad spe-
cialist who did the Willie Horton ads, portrayed former Senator John Durkin
as a flip-flop artist on issues, such as abortion and taxes, that had nothing to
do with autos or foreign trade.31 Autopac faced a different calculus than did
Durkin's Republican opponent, Representative Bob Smith. If run by the
candidate, the ad campaign would persuade some voters while turning off
others. But voters who are turned-off by such an ad campaign are less likely to
hold the candidate accountable for the railings of an independent organiza-
tion.n Indeed, I predict that the constituents of many interest groups will sys-
See id. (citing National Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Tax Briefing Book (last modified May
23, 1997) <http://wwy.ncpa.org/pi/taxes/taxbook/figivl.gif>.
Is Ayres & Bulow, supra note 17, at 861.
29 Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and Consti-
tutional Analysis (draft of Aug. 3, 1999) (manuscript at 31, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association). Professor BeVier subsequently recharacterized our argument as be-
ing "incompletely defended." BeVier, supra note 1, at 1788.
3 Ayres & Bulow, supra note 17, at 861 (citing Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for
Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84
Cal. L. Rev. 1, 19 n.79 (1996)).
31See David Nyhan, The GOP-Japanese Connection *in N.H., Boston Globe, Feb. 9,
1992, at 77; John Milne, N.H. Senate Candidate, Responding to Ads, Denounces "Japs,"
Boston Globe, Oct. 27, 1990, at 27.
32 Other examples of independent expenditures on negative ads include National Rifle
Association expenditures on ads and phone campaigns targeting Representative Mike Sy-
nar in the 1994 Democratic primary in Oklahoma, see Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Beating the
System: This Year More than Ever, Candidates Get Help from Special-Interest Groups
that S-T-R-E-T-C-H the Rules, Time, Oct. 21, 1997, at 32; Robert Dreyfuss, Political Snip-
ers, Am. Prospect, Fall 1995, at 28; Larry J. Sabato & Glen R. Simpson, When Push Comes
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tematically prefer more extreme, negative statements concerning their posi-
tion. Unregulated, issue advocacy may have a salutary effect on agenda-
setting, but Professor BeVier's assertion that the negativity and recklessness of
issue ads is undefended is not true.
Im. MANDATING "PARTIAL ANONYMITY" IS MORE CONSISTENT
WITH NEGATIVE FREEDOM
Finally, let me suggest that a regime that mandates partial anonymity may
be a type of regulation that is more consonant with Professor BeVier's project
of preserving negative liberty than with the traditional "regulationist" im-
pulses of limiting independent expenditures themselves or mandating public
disclosure of the speakers' identities. Of course, Professor BeVier would still
certainly prefer the current laissez-faire treatment of issue advocacy under
Buckley v. Valeo33 -in which neither information about the speakers' identities
nor the amounts of expenditures are regulated." But in this Section, my goal
is to convince Professor BeVier that, if she had to accept some form of issue
advocacy regulation, partial anonymity should be preferable to the tradi-
tional alternatives.
Under Buckley, the constitutionality of disclosure and contribution regula-
tions has moved in lockstep: If the state could constitutionally limit contribu-
tions, then it could constitutionally mandate disclosure; if the state cannot
constitutionally limit contributions, then it cannot constitutionally mandate
disclosure In this Section, however, I would like to suggest that it might be
time to decouple the state's ability to regulate disclosure and contributions.
Even if we do not believe that there is a sufficient constitutional rationale for
limiting certain contributions and expenditures, there might be sufficient jus-
tification for limiting the informational freedom of the payor. And more
specifically, even if we do not believe that there is sufficient justification for
mandating disclosure, we may conclude that there is sufficient constitutional
justification for mandating partial anonymity.
By way of comparison, it is useful to note that we have already decoupled
informational and contribution regulation with regard to the "soft money"'
to Poll; Negative Telephone Calling in Political Campaigns, Wash. Monthly, June 1996, at
26, and American Medical Association expenditures for Vic Fazio on negative TV ads
against challenger H.L. Richardson in California's 1992 congressional election, see To Win
Friends and Influence Pols, U.S. News & World Rep't, May 24, 1993, at 30.
33424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See id. at 44 (holding that expenditure limitations of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 ("FECA"), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994 & Supp. 1997)) do not apply to issue advocacy); id. at 80 (similarly
restricting the coverage of FECA disclosure requirements).
3- See id. at 28.
6 "Soft money" refers to the funds raised by political party committees that are not sub-
ject to the contribution limitations of FECA.
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of political parties. Contributors can give unlimited amounts of soft money
to national party soft money accounts,37 but their identities and the amounts
they have given must be disclosed under current FEC regulation. Bradley
Smith nicely points out that trying to limit soft money contributions used by
the national party for issue advocacy would violate Buckley.39 But no one
(including Smith) seems to object to the current disclosure requirement for
soft money contributions, which would seem also to violate the Buckley hold-
ing that one could not mandate disclosure of the identities of people funding
issue advocacy campaigns.' When a national party is the intermediary, it
seems that mandated disclosure of such funding is constitutional, even if soft
money contribution limits would not be.
The case for decoupling is all the stronger with regard to mandating partial
anonymity. As Professor BeVier acknowledges:
[T]he case for disclosure ... has the undeniable merit of all nostrums
in praise of the idea that more information is better than less. How-
ever, powerful countervailing considerations support speakers' claims
to anonymity. And, though the Supreme Court clearly recognizes that
shielding anonymous speakers undermines the informed voter objec-
tive, it has permitted claims to anonymity to trump those of disclosure
in many very significant political debate contexts.
The solicitude given anonymity suggests that mandating partial anonymity might
be less damaging to core First Amendment values than mandating disclosure.
Under such a regime, contributions to fund issue ad campaigns initially
would be made anonymously, through a conduit such as a blind trust. Partial
disclosure would give the contributor/speaker the option of remaining
anonymous or of proving that she had contributed by requesting the conduit
publicly to report her identity and the amount of her contribution-but only
up to $200. It would also give the donor the unfettered option of saying that
she had given any amount-it would only prevent -her from credibly proving
to the candidate that she had given more than $200. Elsewhere, Jeremy Bu-
low and I have gone into greater detail about issues of implementation,42 but
See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) (1994) (defining "contribution" to exclude money given other
than for specified purposes); id. § 441a (establishing limits only on "contributions").
m See 11 C.F.R. § 104.8(e) (1990).
39 See Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition on
a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. Legis. 179, 196-99 (1998).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78-80.41BeVier, supra note 1, at 1789 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S.
334,336,348,357 (1995)).
42See Ayres & Bulow, supra note 17, at 852-59; Ian Ayres, Disclosure vs. Anonymity in
Campaign Finance, in Designing Democratic Institutions: NOMOS XLII (Ian Shapiro &
Stephen Macedo eds., forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Ayres, Disclosure] (manuscript at
15-21, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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for now the important point is to see that such a regime, if implementable, is
more consistent with Professor BeVier's goal of furthering negative liberty
than are either expenditure limits or mandated disclosure.
Thus, if we restrict our attention to the issue advocacy ads funded by the
soft money of the national political parties, Professor BeVier should prima
facie be in favor of a partial anonymity regime that gives the contributor
three important options: (1) the option of claiming that she gave any amount;
(2) the option of saying nothing; and (3) the option of proving that she con-
tributed, but only up to $200. In contrast, the current regime more clearly
constricts the contributor's liberty because it forces disclosure of the con-
tributor's identity and the amount given-no ifs, ands, or buts."
But I predict that Professor BeVier and other libertarians would nonethe-
less prefer mandatory disclosure to partial anonymity regimes. They might
claim that their rationale is that anonymity is not achievable, but I conjecture
that the real reason is that partial anonymity is likely to be more effective in
drying up large donations and hence in leveling the playing field." If we
move beyond issue advocacy (where mandated disclosure and contributions
limits are already unconstitutional), the major libertarian objectives are to
repeal all campaign finance restrictions except mandatory disclosure. 5 The
vigorous preference of "antiregulationists" for a mandated-disclosure-only
regime instead of a mandated-anonymity-only regime may show that libertar-
ian proposals are driven more by an effort to make campaign law ineffectual
rather than by a commitment to further negative liberty.'
43 As emphasized above, this discussion of negative liberty ignores the effects on the lib-
erty of others in society. But the attempt here is to be consistent with Professor BeVier's
approach.
"See Ayres & Bulow, supra note 17, at 849-51; Ayres, Disclosure, supra note 42, at 12-14.
4- See Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act, H.R. 1922, 106th Cong. §§ 2, 4
(1999); see also, e.g., Constitutional Issues Related to Campaign Finance Reform, Statement
before the Committee on House Administration, United States House of Representatives
(July 22, 1999) (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <httpJ/www.cato.org/testimony/ct-rp072299.html>
(statement of Roger Pilon, vice president for legal affairs of the Cato Institute, supporting
the Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act, which "would remove the campaign
contribution limits now in place and require instead that candidates and parties promptly
report their financial transactions to the Federal Election Commission for disclosure to the
public"); Doug Bandow, Most "Reform" a Bad Idea, USA Today, Oct. 22, 1997, at 14A,
available in 1997 WL 7017515 (arguing that "Congress and the states should deregulate
elections" and "[a]llow any contribution of any amount, so long as it's fully disclosed").
"There are strong intellectual reasons for predicting that mandated disclosure would be
less effective in deterring corruption than mandated anonymity, see Ayres & Bulow, supra
note 17, at 844-47; Ayres, Disclosure, supra note 42, at 8-10, but for now it is sufficient to
point out the following distinction. Whenever I have discussed subjecting soft money
contributions to mandated anonymity, the audience always worries that such a regulation
would inevitably cause a hydraulic shift toward less-regulated independent issue advocacy.
But no one has ever suggested that mandated disclosure currently has caused such a hydrau-
lic shift-even though soft money contributions deterred because of mandated disclosure
might theoretically shift toward independent issue advocacy (where funder anonymity is
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CONCLUSION
Let me be clear that, in criticizing Professor BeVier's reasons for leaving
issue advocacy unregulated, I do not mean to criticize her conclusion.
Rather, my point here is only to suggest that her analysis is flawed because:
(1) it is based on the inconclusive convictions that negative liberty should be
maximized and that legislative action tends to be self-interested; (2) it fails to
credit some of the empirical observations of her opponents; and (3) it ignores
mandating partial anonymity as a reform alternative to the traditional sug-
gestions of limiting contributions or mandating disclosure.
currently permissible). The possibility of mandated disclosure causing a hydraulic reaction
does not occur to people because people do not believe that mandated disclosure deters
(very many) contributions.
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